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 IFS AND BUTS IN CHARTER 
ADJUDICATION: THE UNRULY 
EMERGENCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXEMPTIONS IN CANADA 
Morris Rosenberg* 
Stéphane Perrault** 
The idea of “constitutional exemptions” is not new to the Canadian legal 
landscape. Starting with Big M Drug Mart1 in 1985, the suggestion that one 
could claim constitutional exemption from the application of a statute has 
floated around and was in fact acted upon by several lower courts. But, for a 
number of years, the idea of constitutional exemptions was approached with 
great reservation by the Supreme Court of Canada, which seemed well aware of 
the potential implications of accepting such a remedy. In the last year and a 
half, however, this prudent awareness appears to have given way to some tacit 
acceptance of the idea that individuals may be relieved from the application of 
an otherwise perfectly valid law. In several recent cases, the Court has referred 
to constitutional exemptions using language that seems to assume the existence 
of such remedy, or at least language that was not accompanied by the Court’s 
usual reservations. This is a matter of concern given the importance of the issue 
not only with respect to remedies but also its implications for judicial review 
and the rule of law in Canada.  
The Canadian jurisprudence points to two distinct types of exemptions. The 
first and less controversial one is a limited or, as we shall refer to it in this 
paper, “ancillary” exemption. This may occur when a piece of legislation is 
struck down, but the declaration of invalidity is suspended in order to give 
Parliament or the legislatures time to respond. During the period of suspension, 
an exemption may be granted such as to relieve the successful Charter2 claim-
ant from either the past or continued application of the statute. In a sense, this is 
an exemption from the effect of the suspension and is merely ancillary to that. 
The second and much more controversial type of exemption is a stand alone 
remedy granted on a case-by-case basis where a court finds that a piece of 
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1
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart]. 
2
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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legislation is generally valid but that it has an unconstitutional effect on a par-
ticular applicant. This type of exemption allows the courts to avoid invalidating 
or interfering with the wording of a statutory provision, while at the same time 
refusing to apply it in the circumstances of a particular case. We shall refer to 
these as “remedial” exemptions. 
This paper will examine some of the ramifications of constitutional exemp-
tions for judicial review in Canada. The first part of the paper shows how re-
medial exemptions reflect a particular understanding of the role of the courts as 
guardians of the Constitution that is more consistent with the American tradi-
tion of judicial review, but is at odds with fundamental aspects of the Canadian 
approach to Charter adjudication. In the second part, we argue that the recogni-
tion of constitutional exemptions in Canada would imply an important deterio-
ration of the “rule of law” as we have come to understand it and cause 
significant problems, not just theoretical but also practical, particularly in the 
application of the criminal law. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
To cast the debate over constitutional exemptions as one that is concerned 
strictly with remedies is misleading. The old proposition according to which 
“rights follow remedies” still carries much truth. The existence or the absence 
of individualized Charter remedies to statutory infirmities is one that has pro-
found implications on the manner in which Charter claims are made and adju-
dicated. It affects matters of standing, defines the scope of a court’s inquiry and 
the extent of the government’s burden to justify statutory interferences with 
protected rights and freedoms. Underlying the debate over constitutional ex-
emptions is a debate over the manner and scope of judicial review under the 
Charter. 
1. Exemptive Remedies and Judicial Review in the United States 
It is fair to assume that the controversy surrounding remedial exemptions in 
Canada would come as somewhat of a surprise to an observing American law-
yer. In the United States, “facial invalidity” — i.e., what we refer to in Canada 
as “striking down” — is the exception. Only in rare cases will U.S. courts find 
that a statute or a particular provision is “facially” invalid — that is, invalid in 
all of its applications, leading to a declaration of general invalidity.  
The normal course in which constitutional disputes are resolved in the U.S. 
is through the operation of the doctrine of “as applied invalidity”. Under this 
doctrine, a statutory provision that produces unconstitutional effects “as ap-
plied” to a litigant in a particular case will simply not be enforced by the courts 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Ifs and Buts in Charter Adjudication 377 
 
in that case, but will otherwise remain in force. The doctrine of “as applied 
invalidity” may result in judicial pronouncements that more or less clearly 
suggest that a certain class of persons, beyond the litigants, will not be subject 
to the impugned provision. Nonetheless, this is a matter of being able to predict 
how the courts will respond to similar situations in the future; it is not the result 
of a formal remedy directed at a class of persons, as is the case when Canadian 
courts use “reading in” or “reading down” to remedy an offending provision. A 
good example is perhaps the famous case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 where a 
compulsory school attendance law was held by the United States Supreme 
Court not to apply to members of the Amish faith on the ground that this inter-
fered with religious freedom. This effectively amounted to a remedial exemp-
tion for the Amish community. 
The American preference for the case-by-case approach of “as applied inva-
lidity” is reflected in numerous facets of judicial review, ranging from issues of 
standing to the manner in which court decisions are articulated.  
In the U.S., strict standing rules generally prevent a litigant from invoking 
factual situations other than his own in order to demonstrate that a law is 
impermissibly vague or overbroad. According to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the prin-
ciple that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be 
heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied un-
constitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. […] A closely re-
lated principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted 
vicariously. […] These principles rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They 
reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not roving 
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws. […] 
Constitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified 
only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the liti-
gants brought before the Court […].4 
Indeed, the foundations of American judicial review, as originally articulated 
in Marbury v. Madison,5 are based on a pragmatic necessity for the courts to 
choose between conflicting norms in resolving concrete disputes. In Marbury, 
Chief Justice Marshall thus asked (somewhat rhetorically): 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably 
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disre-
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
4
  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, at 610-11 (1973). 
5
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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garding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs 
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution and the constitution is superior to 
any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act must 
govern the case to which they both apply.6 
Almost two centuries later, the issue in the flag burning case of Texas v. 
Johnson was therefore not whether a statute could validly prohibit the desecra-
tion of the flag despite the First Amendment protection of free speech but, as 
articulated by Justice Brennan, “whether the State’s interest in preserving the 
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson’s convic-
tion”.7 Having found that it could not justify Johnson’s conviction, the Court 
expressed no need to consider whether the statute could validly apply in other 
situations or whether it should be declared unconstitutional. 
There is thus in the United States a clear and deeply rooted connection be-
tween the foundations of judicial review, the limitations on standing and re-
course to “as applied invalidity”. 
This is not to say that in the U.S. statutes are never struck down, or that the 
courts never look to factual situations beyond that of the litigants before them 
in order to resolve issues arising under the Bill of Rights. Indeed, free speech 
jurisprudence recognizes that a provision that restricts speech may be declared 
“facially invalid” if it is found substantially overbroad based on its application 
to hypothetical situations.8 Such a statute will be struck down, in whole or in 
part, unless it can be cured through judicial “reconstruction”.9 However, a 
statute will not be found facially overbroad where its impermissible applica-
tions “although substantial in absolute number, [are] insubstantial when com-
                                                                                                                                                              
6
  Id., at 178. 
7
  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, at 410 (1989). 
8
  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The application of the overbreadth doctrine re-
cently resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down portions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act that prohibited the possession of, inter alia, any visual depiction that “appears to 
be” of a minor engaged in sexual activity, whether or not the depiction contravenes community 
standards and despite the fact that the material may have serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, U.S. S. Ct. No. 00795 (April 16, 2002). 
9
  In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 
State prohibition on the possession of child pornography. The provision captured material “that 
shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity”, subject to specific excep-
tions. However, the provision had been construed by the Ohio Supreme Court as reading: “that 
shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, where such nudity consti-
tutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals”. The U.S. Supreme Court found 
that the provision, as construed by the lower court, was constitutionally permissible. 
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pared to the law’s legitimate application”.10 According to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, facial overbreadth is “strong medecine” that is to be applied “sparingly 
and only as a last resort”.11 
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine thus provides limited exceptions 
to ordinary standing rules, allowing a party to rely on fact situations other than 
his or her own. It is worth pointing out that the rationale given for this relaxa-
tion of the standing rules — namely that sweeping legislation may have a 
“chilling effect” on speech — only makes full sense in light of the ordinary 
preference for “as applied invalidity”. It is indeed largely because of the case-
by-case aspect of judicial review under the “as applied invalidity” doctrine that 
overly broad legislation can have a chilling effect on speech, since under this 
approach individuals who are not party to the litigation lack sufficient certainty 
as to reassure them that their expressive activities will also receive judicial 
protection.  
It is not surprising that, by contrast, “chilling effect” has not in Canada been 
much of a buzzword in freedom of expression jurisprudence. This follows 
naturally from the fact that Charter adjudication in Canada is a significantly 
different exercise, governed by different rules and premised on a different 
understanding of judicial review. 
2.  Exemptive Remedies and Judicial Review in Canada 
Canadian courts have only in the last 20 years embarked on judicial review 
based on constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. Before the Charter 
came into force, however, the judicial function in Canada had already distin-
guished itself from its American counterpart.  
Noteworthy in this regard is the recognition in 1912 that the Supreme Court 
of Canada could properly give opinions on abstract issues of law referred to it 
by the Governor General in Council.12 The previous year, the United States 
Supreme Court had refused similar jurisdiction on the ground that the Constitu-
tion invested the courts only with jurisdiction over “cases” and “controversies” 
and that the power to pronounce on constitutional matters could only be exer-
                                                                                                                                                              
10
  Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 1988), at 1025, commenting on Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, supra, note 4. The decision in Broadrick dealt with a rule limiting political activities of 
civil service employees. Despite its sweeping terms, the court refused to strike the provision. That 
decision stands in sharp contrast with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Osborne v. 
Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, where a similar rule was struck down on the basis 
that it was over-inclusive. 
11
  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, note 4, at 613. 
12
  Re References by Governor General-in-Council (1910), 43 S.C.R. 536; aff’d. [1912] A.C. 
571 (sub nom. Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada). 
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cised, as expressed in Marbury v. Madison, in the course of “pronouncing 
judgment between the parties to a case”.13 This greater openness of Canadian 
courts to entertain abstract issues of law became manifest in early Charter 
jurisprudence. Early landmark cases like Hunter v. Southam,14 in 1984, and R. 
v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,15 in 1985, paved the way to a conception of the role 
of the courts as guardians of the Constitution that did not simply amount to the 
narrow resolution of concrete disputes, but rather had the courts pronouncing 
on the law in a much more general way. 
In Hunter v. Southam Inc.,16 which remains the guiding decision on section 8 
search and seizure protection, the Supreme Court departed from American 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by holding that for a search to be reasonable 
it must be authorized by law and the law must be reasonable. These require-
ments mean that Canadian courts are not simply to look at the reasonableness 
of a particular search, but must also pronounce on the general validity of the 
legal regime authorizing the search. In that case, as for example in the subse-
quent case of Baron v. R.,17 the searches themselves may have been perfectly 
reasonable, but the regimes were not and could, in hypothetical situations, lead 
to unreasonable searches. For that reason, they were struck down. 
The following year, in Big M Drug Mart, the Court held that in a prosecution 
for the violation of a Sunday observance law a corporation has standing to 
challenge the law based on freedom of religion. The issue, according to the 
Court, was not whether the accused corporation could exercise the right to 
freedom of religion (which it arguably does not possess) but rather whether it 
could be convicted for violating an unconstitutional statute. The Court was 
concerned not with upholding the personal rights of the accused, nor did it see 
its role merely as the arbiter of an isolated dispute. In its view, s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 198218 required that invalid laws not be given effect, and 
therefore that its role was to pronounce on the general validity of the impugned 
provision independently of the particular facts of the case.19 
                                                                                                                                                              
13
  Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
14
  (sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation 
Branch), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
15
  Supra, note 1. 
16
  Supra, note 14. 
17
  [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416. 
18
  Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
19
  A similar approach is taken by the South African Constitutional Court, as illustrated by the 
recent decision in Islamic Community Convention v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, CCT 
36/01, April 11 2002. The case arose from a complaint regarding a radio broadcast that was consid-
ered to constitute hate speech contrary to clause 2(a) of the Code of Conduct for Broadcasting 
Services in that it was “likely to prejudice […] relations between sections of the population.” The 
issue was whether this clause was inconsistent with freedom of expression under s. 16 of the South 
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Big M Drug Mart opened wide the door to the use of reasonable hypotheti-
cals, either in the context of deciding whether a substantive Charter right is 
infringed — for example, regarding section 12 protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment, as illustrated by R. v. Smith20 — or in the context of sec-
tion 1, particularly with respect to discussions of overbreadth, as illustrated by 
the more recent case of Sharpe21 on child pornography.  
In Canada, this extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals, unfettered by is-
sues of standing, allows for a fulsome scrutiny of a provision’s validity in light 
of myriad possible applications — contrasting in this regard with the much 
more restrained American tradition of judicial review and reducing the neces-
sity or the appeal of exemptive remedies. 
Interestingly, Big M Drug Mart is the first case to make any reference to the 
possibility of constitutional exemptions. The issue was raised by Dickson C.J. 
in cursory fashion in a discussion of standing. This should not come as a sur-
prise, given the close nexus between issues of standing, the scope of judicial 
review and individualized remedies. Nor is it surprising that Dickson C.J. did 
not dwell on the matter of individual exemptions, given the direction taken by 
the Court on the issue of standing.  
Constitutional exemptions were first given clear judicial recognition in 1987 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Seaboyer,22 dealing with the “rape-shield” 
provision of the Criminal Code.23 All five judges found the provision to violate 
the Charter on the ground that it could, in some cases, compromise trial fairness. 
A three-judge majority, however, chose not to strike down the provision but 
rather leave it to future judges to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis where 
required to comply with the Charter. While the reasoning of the majority was 
based on a view that the application of the provision would be constitutionally 
problematic only in relatively rare circumstances and that it would be extremely 
                                                                                                                                                              
African Constitution which specifically excludes “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnici-
ty, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm” [s. 16(2)(c)]. In deciding the 
matter, the Constitutional Court paid no regard to the actual content of the broadcast, but merely 
considered the impugned provision. It stated in this regard (para. 21): 
Although the matter has its origins in the complaint by the Board in respect of a spe-
cific broadcast, the function of this Court in the present proceedings is to adjudicate on the 
question of the constitutionality of clause 2(a) of the Code in relation to that complaint as an 
abstract and objective one. The contents of the particular statement in respect of which the 
Board complains are not relevant to the enquiry. What the Court is concerned with is 
whether the provision on which the complaint was based is consistent with the right to free-
dom of expression in section 16 of the Constitution” [emphasis added]. 
20
 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045. 
21
  R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, discussed below. 
22
  R. v. Seaboyer (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 290 (C.A.). 
23
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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difficult for Parliament to devise an exhaustive list of exceptions, it is telling that 
the majority also relied heavily on American jurisprudence under the Bill of 
Rights in support of the appropriateness of constitutional exemptions. 
Other Canadian courts followed thereafter. In 1989, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal held in R. v. Chief
 24 that the mandatory firearms prohibition of 
the Criminal Code could, in the case of trappers such as the accused, amount to 
a cruel and unusual punishment. Rather than striking down the provision, which 
the Court found to be appropriate with respect to the vast majority of the popu-
lation, the majority opted for a remedial exemption in favour of the accused. 
Since then, a number of lower courts have recognized the availability of re-
medial exemptions, although the judicial response has been far from uniform 
across the country.25 
The Supreme Court had a first real opportunity to deal with the issue of re-
medial exemptions in the case of Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board),26 deal-
ing with a broad prohibition on public service employees participating in 
partisan political activities. A majority found that the legislation violated free-
dom of expression and association and that it could not be justified under sec-
tion 1 due to overbreadth. While all members of the majority agreed that the 
provision had to be struck, three suggested without deciding that remedial 
exemptions could be appropriate in some cases.27 Wilson J., with the support of 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., strongly objected. In their view, having found that a provi-
sion is overbroad and cannot be justified pursuant to section 1 of the Charter: 
… the Court has no alternative but to strike the legislation down or, if the unconsti-
tutional aspects are severable, to strike it down to the extent of its inconsistency 
with the Constitution. I do not believe that it is open to the Court in these circum-
stances to create exemptions to the legislation (which, in my view, presupposes its 
constitutional validity) and grant individual remedies under s. 24(1) of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In other words, it is not, in my opinion, open 
to the Court to cure over-inclusiveness on a case by case basis leaving the legisla-
tion in its pristine over-inclusive form outstanding on the books.28 
                                                                                                                                                              
24
  (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (B.C. C.A.). 
25
  The situation in the various provinces is canvassed by Peter Sankoff in “Constitutional 
Exemptions: Myth or Reality?”, (2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 411, at 429-31. Remedial exemptions have so 
far been clearly approved by the courts in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfound-
land, but rejected by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. The Courts in Quebec and Ontario have 
not resolved the matter in any conclusive way, although the Ontario Court of Appeal clearly did 
endorse ancillary exemptions in the recent case of R. v. Parker (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 481.  
26
 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69. 
27
  Id., at 105. 
28
  Id., at 76-77. 
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When Seaboyer29 reached the Supreme Court shortly thereafter, the issue 
was back on the table. Reversing the majority of the Court of Appeal, the Court 
struck down the rape-shield provision. McLachlin J., writing for a majority of 
seven, was highly critical of remedial exemptions. Without ruling that exemp-
tions would never be appropriate, her reasons were less than favourable. Noting 
that, at least in this case, resort to remedial exemptions “would import into the 
provision an element which the legislature specifically chose to exclude — the 
discretion of the trial judge”, McLachlin J. (as she then was) added: 
The doctrine, as applied in this case, delegates to the trial judge the task of deter-
mining when the legislation should not be applied. This amounts to saying that it 
should not be applied when it should not be applied, unless some criterion outside 
the Charter is found. On this reasoning, no law would be required to be struck 
down under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982; the matter could always be re-
solved by the simple means of instructing trial judges not to apply laws when their 
effect would be violative.30 
While her criticism of exemptions was not an attempt to provide a fully ar-
ticulated doctrine on the issue — which she clearly did not have to do — it is 
telling that she passingly referred to cases such as Big M Drug Mart,31 Hunter 
v. Southam Inc.32 and R. v. Smith33 in support of her position, indicating at least 
a clear sense that remedial exemptions would not be easily reconcilable with 
the path in which these cases had taken judicial review in Canada. 
Two years later, in the highly controversial case of Rodriguez34 regarding as-
sisted suicide, the issue of exemptions was again before the Court. The im-
pugned Criminal Code provision was upheld by a 5-4 majority. In dissent, 
however, Lamer C.J. considered the possibility of constitutional exemptions. 
He concluded, like Wilson J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Osborne, that remedial 
exemptions should not be used as an alternative to striking down overly broad 
statutory provisions. However, Lamer C.J. indicated that, where a Court strikes 
down a statutory provision pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
but decides to suspend the declaration of invalidity, exemptions could be issued 
during the period of suspension.35 This is what we have referred to as “ancil-
lary” exemptions. 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
  R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
30
  Id., at 628-29. 
31
  Supra, note 1. 
32
  Supra, note 14. 
33
  Supra, note 20. 
34
  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
35
  Id., at 571-79. 
384  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Except for a brief comment by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Rose (1998),36 the is-
sue of exemptions was not again discussed by the Supreme Court until Cor-
biere (1999),37 where a residency requirement for voting under the Indian Act38 
was unanimously found to offend the Charter. While all agreed that the provi-
sion had to be struck down and that a constitutional exemption would not be 
appropriate, a majority nonetheless indicated in obiter that: 
The remedy of constitutional exemption has been recognized in a very limited way 
in this Court, to protect the interests of a party who has succeeded in having a legis-
lative provision declared unconstitutional, where the declaration of invalidity has 
been suspended; see Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at pp. 715-17; 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 577.39 
As for the broader use of remedial exemptions as an alternative to striking 
down, it was approved by a four-judge minority, the strongest endorsement of 
remedial exemptions by the Supreme Court to date. The majority, however, 
expressly refrained from deciding the matter. 
In the following years, a significant number of cases again raised the issue of 
exemptive remedies. While the Supreme Court avoided in each case deciding 
or even debating the question, it sent troubling signals that we may be going 
down the path of remedial exemptions. 
The first of these cases is R. v. Morrisey,40 upholding a minimum four-year 
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death with a firearm. Gonthier J., 
writing for five of the seven judges, found it “unnecessary to consider the 
availability of constitutional exemptions” given the facts of the case.41 How-
ever, Gonthier J. also restricted the use of reasonable hypotheticals in section 
12 analysis to “imaginable circumstances which would commonly arise with a 
degree of generality appropriate to the particular offence”.42 Real life situations, 
even if taken from reported cases, would not necessarily qualify unless they 
reflected common occurrences. It is unclear to what extent this will lead to a 
departure from previous practice regarding the use of reasonable hypotheticals 
                                                                                                                                                              
36
  R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at para. 66. Interestingly, L’Heureux-Dubé J. supported 
the use of remedial exemptions, despite her previous position in Osborne, supra, note 26. 
37
  Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203. 
38
  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
39
  Id., at para. 22. As pointed out by Peter Sankoff, the Supreme Court in Schachter had 
clearly done no such thing as recognize constitutional exemptions. Sankoff, supra, note 25, at 429. 
As to the Rodriguez decision, Lamer C.J.’s approval of ancillary exemption was not endorsed by 
the majority, nor was it clearly endorsed by the other minority judges, although McLachlin J. 
suggests otherwise in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at para. 179. 
40
  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90. 
41
  Id., at para. 56. 
42
  Id., at para. 50. 
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under section 12, or whether this could also affect the use of such hypotheticals 
under section 1. If so, however, this could well make remedial exemptions 
more appealing in situations where the Court has already upheld a particular 
provision. In concurring reasons, Arbour J. rejected what she saw as an unduly 
restrictive use of hypotheticals, yet nonetheless indicated that she would uphold 
the general validity of the mandatory four-year sentence “while declining to 
apply it in a future case if the minimum penalty is found to be grossly dispro-
portionate for that future offender”43 — language which indisputably points to 
remedial exemptions. It is noteworthy that Arbour J. was joined by McLachlin 
C.J., despite her previously expressed disdain for exemptions in Seaboyer. 
Most observers expected the Court to squarely deal with the issue in the high 
profile case of R. v. Latimer, where the trial judge had granted an exemption 
from the mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 10 
years.44 The trial judge’s decision was overturned by the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal,45 not because exemptions could never be granted, but because it had 
previously decided that an exemption was inappropriate on the facts of the 
case.46 Having fully heard from the parties and interveners on the issue of ex-
emptions — including a forceful objection by the Attorney General of Canada 
— the Supreme Court rendered its unanimous judgment in January 2001.47 In a 
short and cryptic statement, it held that “[w]here there is no violation of Mr. 
Latimer’s s. 12 right there is no basis for granting a constitutional exemption”.48 
While it did not decide the existence of exemptive remedies, neither did the 
Court express the usual reservations. 
Less than 10 days later, in another high profile case dealing with child por-
nography, R. v. Sharpe,49 the same pattern emerged. The majority in Sharpe 
found that the Criminal Code’s definition of child pornography was overly 
broad in its application to the possession offence. Of particular concern was the 
fact that the offence captured works of the imagination created by the accused 
alone and kept for his or her personal use, as well as private recordings of 
persons under the age of 18 engaged in lawful sexual activity. In discussing 
possible remedies, McLachlin C.J. rejected the option of simply striking down 
the provision and leaving the matter to Parliament. McLachlin C.J. wrote: 
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The difficulty with this remedy is that it nullifies a law that is valid in most of its 
applications. Until Parliament can pass another law, the evil targeted goes unreme-
died. Why, one might well ask, should a law that is substantially constitutional be 
struck down simply because the accused can point to a hypothetical application that 
is far removed from his own case which might not be constitutional?50 
Such a conundrum, of course, arises only if remedial exemptions are not 
available to cure marginal infirmities in the statute. Thus, while in that case 
exemptions were not argued, McLachlin C.J., for the majority, nonetheless 
wrote: 
Yet another alternative might be to uphold the law on the basis that it is constitu-
tionally valid in the vast majority of its applications and stipulate that if and when 
unconstitutional applications arise, the accused may seek a constitutional exemp-
tion. Ross, who concludes that s. 163.1(4) is constitutional in most but not all of its 
applications, recommends this remedy: Ross, supra, at p. 58.51 
Again, no caution was expressed beyond the use of the conditional “might”. 
The majority simply decided that an exemption was not necessary in that case 
and that the appropriate remedy was to “read in” certain exceptions to the 
provision in order to cure its overbreadth. 
Interestingly, however, the paragraph dealing with the possibility of remedial 
exemptions is preceded by one in which McLachlin C.J. states: 
Another alternative might be to hold that the law as it applies to the case at bar is 
valid, declining to find it unconstitutional on the basis of a hypothetical scenario 
that has not yet arisen. In the United States, courts have frequently declined to 
strike out laws on the basis of hypothetical situations not before the court, although 
less so in First Amendment (free expression) cases. While the Canadian jurispru-
dence on the question is young, thus far it suggests that laws may be struck out on 
the basis of hypothetical situations, provided they are “reasonable”.52 
This paragraph is certainly awkward at this stage of the reasons in a discus-
sion of remedies, since it suggests that the entire approach under which the case 
was litigated and adjudicated may not be the appropriate one at all, given that 
the problematic applications of the provision (i.e., works of the imagination and 
recordings of lawful sexual activities) had no connection to the facts of the 
case. Nonetheless, it is telling that this questioning of the use of reasonable 
hypotheticals comes into play immediately prior to the suggestion that remedial 
exemptions may be an available option. While the court does not make any 
explicit connection between the two, the juxtaposition clearly suggests the 
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Court’s awareness of the relationship between remedial exemptions and the 
scope of judicial review. Indeed, the statement that “[w]hile the Canadian 
jurisprudence on the question is young, thus far it suggests that laws may be 
struck out on the basis of hypothetical situations” appears to suggest an over-
ture towards revisiting the use of reasonable hypotheticals in Charter adjudica-
tion. 
Whether the Supreme Court will want to recognize remedial exemptions in 
the future will depend in part on its willingness to reconsider the approach 
developed in the early years of the Charter regarding issues of standing, the use 
of reasonable hypotheticals and the scope of its mandate under section 52 of the 
Constitution. However, this choice should also be informed by considerations 
which relate to the implications of constitutional exemptions for the rule of law. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The objections that we wish to formulate here reflect the belief that constitu-
tional exemptions would imply an important deterioration of the “rule of law” 
as we have come to understand it and cause significant problems, not just theo-
retical but also practical, in  
particular with respect to the application of the criminal law. Our purpose here 
is not to attempt to formulate a coherent doctrine of the rule of law, which 
would be a daunting enterprise in itself, but rather to point to a “cluster” of 
concepts or ideals traditionally  
associated with the rule of law or which have become so in more recent times, 
and which are directly relevant to the debate on constitutional exemptions: 
ideas such as “equality before the law”, certainty, public order and civil disobe-
dience, or — more recently — the concept of a “constitutional dialogue” be-
tween the courts and the legislatures. 
1. The Rule of Law, Certainty and the Importance of the Generic 
Perhaps the main argument in support of constitutional exemptions is the 
flexibility that exemptions provide when courts are dealing with difficult con-
stitutional issues in particular fact situations. While undeniable, the benefits of 
flexibility come at a cost. As expressed by Oonagh Fitzgerald, the recognition 
of constitutional exemptions: 
… seems to embody an approach seriously at odds with traditional notions of the 
rule of law. Recognizing constitutional exemptions undermines the certainty of 
law, increases the need for litigation to determine their application to specific cases, 
and gives the courts almost unlimited discretionary power to make and unmake 
positive laws as they apply to different people. It is, perhaps, a remedy from Pan-
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dora’s box: if we reach in to take it in what seems an appropriate case, who knows 
what other problems will be unleashed.53 
According to Lon Fuller’s classic exposé, law is “the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules”.54 Fuller writes: 
Surely, the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the citizen (by 
putting him in jail, for example, or declaring invalid a deed under which he claims 
title to property) a government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as 
those to be followed by the citizen and as being determinative of his rights and du-
ties. If the Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing. Applying rules faith-
fully implies, in turn, that rules will take the form of general declarations; it would 
make little sense, for example, if the government were today to enact a special law 
whereby Jones should be put in jail and then tomorrow were “faithfully” to follow 
this “rule” by actually putting him in jail. Furthermore, if the law is intended to 
permit a man to conduct his own affairs subject to an obligation to observe certain 
restraints imposed by superior authority, this implies that he will not be told at each 
turn what to do; law furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, not a detailed set 
of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives.55 
It is thus broadly understood that the rule of law embodies an ideal-type le-
gal order characterized by certain qualities, which typically include, as in Lon 
Fuller’s exposé, a desire for clarity, generality and prospectivity. Yet, all three 
of these virtues are compromised by the use of constitutional exemptions. 
Clarity and certainty in law are of course never achieved, only facilitated. 
The idea is not absolute certainty, as recognized by the Supreme Court in nu-
merous instances, but a requirement that  
lawmakers provide as much guidance as is reasonably possible in order to 
permit a reasoned debate. This requirement, which applies equally to courts, is 
essential to sustain the claim that ours is “a government of laws and not of 
men.” In adjudicating Charter cases, it is fundamental that courts provide citi-
zens, governments and legislatures sufficient guidance to guide their actions. 
This is true not only with respect to the interpretation of the Charter’s substan-
tive protections, but also with respect to the remedies applied in curing consti-
tutional infirmities in statutes, and the result of these remedial actions by the 
courts on the state of the law.  
While judicial interpretation is by no means an exact science, a decision is 
reasonable, as opposed to capricious, if it reflects (a) the application of recog-
nizable principles to categories of facts based on a demonstration of relevance, 
as well as (b) the linking of the facts of the case to the same categories. The 
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ability to convincingly abstract from the particulars of a case to generic catego-
ries that are shown to be relevant to the legal principles is essential to legitimate 
judicial decision-making under the rule of law. It is essential, in other words, to 
the judges’ “interpretative claim” — the claim, which is inherent to the rule of 
law, that the judge is not deciding by fiat, but rather that he or she is interpret-
ing the law as something distinct from simply exerting his or her personal will. 
Competent judicial decision-making thus implies references to generic or ab-
stract categories that serve both to ground the decision’s legitimacy in law and, 
in cases where constitutional infirmities are identified, to forecast potential 
avenues for remedying those infirmities. Exemptions are problematic in that 
they allow the courts to alter the state of the law, yet avoid the essential task of 
identifying the factors and principles that provide a more or less clear “generic” 
sense of the law’s future application. Hence McLachlin J.’s criticism of exemp-
tions in Seaboyer — that exemptions delegate “to the trial judge the task of 
determining when the legislation should not be applied. This amounts to saying 
that it should not be applied when it should not be applied, unless some crite-
rion outside the Charter is found”.56 While it may sometimes appear convenient 
to dispose of a case without having to sketch out a blueprint for the future, 
doing so creates difficulties that should not be underestimated.  
These difficulties are by no means limited to remedial exemptions but also 
exist with respect to the more limited “ancillary” exemptions that may accom-
pany the suspension of a declaration of invalidity. 
This may be illustrated by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. 
Guignard,57 where the Court struck down a municipal offence regarding the 
erection of advertising signs outside an industrial zone on the basis that it re-
stricted freedom of expression in a manner that was overly broad. In cursory 
fashion, the Court suspended the declaration of invalidity and acquitted the 
accused. While there was no discussion of the matter, this was in effect an 
ancillary exemption.58 Of particular concern to the Court in Guignard was the 
fact that the by-law defined an advertising sign as a: 
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Sign indicating at least the name of a company and drawing attention to a business, 
a product, a service or an entertainment carried on, sold or offered other than the 
property on which it is placed.59 
On a literal reading, this definition captured consumer “counter-advertising”, 
as illustrated by the accused’s posted expression of dissatisfaction with an 
insurance company. In striking down the provision, the Court wrote: 
The only appropriate remedy in this case is a declaration that the provisions of the 
municipal by-law the appellant has challenged are invalid. Because of the consider-
able overlap between the definitions and the provision imposing the ban, the decla-
ration of nullity must apply to both the definition and the ban itself. That is the 
relief that follows from the type of challenge that was brought. A solution that ap-
plied solely and personally to the appellant would not satisfactorily resolve the le-
gal problem before us. However, given the importance of the zoning by-law in 
municipal land use planning and the risk of creating acquired rights, during a pe-
riod in which there was a legal vacuum, which could be set up against a subsequent 
by-law, that relief must be tempered by suspending the declaration of invalidity for 
a period of six months, to give the municipality an opportunity to revise its by-law. 
It will no doubt be in the respondent’s interests to rethink the definition of “adver-
tising sign”, in particular, and more clearly identify the real objectives of the bans 
imposed. The appellant must therefore be acquitted of the charge against him.60 
Leaving aside the Court’s passing reference to an individualized remedy, the 
suspension of a declaration of invalidity relating to an offence should raise an 
eyebrow. Not that it is entirely unprecedented. It was done at least once before 
in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference,61 but in a context where the con-
sequences of not suspending the declaration of invalidity were clearly more 
dramatic than here. In that case, the failure to suspend would have led to the 
obliteration of all provincial offences, including offences that are essential to 
public safety. The concern in Guignard is of a different order. The concern is 
with the potential creation of acquired rights to commercial advertisement in 
Saint-Hyacinthe during the period between the decision and the adoption of a 
new by-law. Assuming that one can properly acquire rights in this context, 
there is no doubt that this is something which can be fixed by legislation. If 
such a concern is of sufficient importance to warrant the suspension of the 
declaration of invalidity, it is difficult to see when a suspension would not be 
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ordered, even where the constitutionally defective provision is a criminal of-
fence.62 
While the power of courts to temporarily suspend the effect of a declaration 
of invalidity is welcome and has indeed become a critical tool in what has been 
described as the “dialogue” between courts and legislators (a matter which is 
addressed further below), suspensions in connection to invalid offences consti-
tute a special category that require considerable caution. Granting a suspension 
makes it difficult to resist granting the accused an ancillary exemption with  
respect to the successfully challenged offence and raises the more difficult 
question of who, other than the accused, may benefit from such an exemption 
during the period of suspension. This issue was raised by McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) in Miron v. Trudel,63 a  
non-criminal case dealing with the definition of “spouse” under the Ontario 
Insurance Act.64 A majority of the Court found that the exclusion of unmarried 
couples violated section 15(1) of the Charter and held that the word “spouse” 
should be read as including common law spouses. In rejecting the possibility of 
a suspension combined with an ancillary exemption, she wrote: 
Assuming the Court were inclined to grant the appellants an exemption from the 
1980 legislation and insurance policy provisions, the question remains of how it 
could do so without creating further inequities between the appellants and others in 
their situation who have been denied benefits. To avoid this, any constitutional ex-
emption would have to be extended to all similar families. This in turn would re-
quire formulation of general criteria of eligibility, thus involving the court in the 
very activity which would have led it to eschew “reading up” the 1980 statute in 
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conformity with the terms legislated in 1990. Yet to deny such persons a remedy 
would be to perpetuate the effects of a discrimination which the Court has found to 
violate the Charter when the obvious remedy — the payment of the benefits that 
should have been paid — remains available [emphasis added].65 
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference,66 the suspension of the declara-
tion of invalidity operated equally for all in that, during the period of suspen-
sion, all persons continued to be subject to the province’s laws, including 
provincial offences.67 Here, in Guignard, the Court suspended the declaration 
of invalidity, yet acquitted the accused not only without discussion but as if this 
were a matter of logical or legal necessity (“The appellant must therefore be 
acquitted of the charge against him.”) — without inquiring as to the implica-
tions for other individuals. It may be inferred from the reasoning of the Court in 
Guignard that the by-law should not apply to anyone engaged in non-
commercial expression but that it should otherwise be applicable. If so, how-
ever, one is left to wonder why the definition was not simply “read-down” in 
this way, leaving the provision intact for all of its permissible applications. But 
if this assessment of the decision’s implications is wrong (and the fact that the 
impugned rule was struck rather than simply read down suggests that it is in-
deed an incorrect assessment), then what, one may ask, is the state of the law 
on signs during the period of suspension?  
If anything is clear, it seems obvious that the preference for certainty and the 
generic under the rule of law requires that situations such as these should be 
avoided. Even if we accept that ancillary exemptions have now been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court, their application to defective offence provisions, 
whether in the Criminal Code or in a regulatory context, requires considerable 
caution and should occur only exceptionally. 
The use of remedial exemptions in the criminal law is equally problematic, if 
not more so. Remedial exemptions have most often been considered in relation 
to mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code. This was the case, for 
example in Chief
 68 (where an exemption was granted), regarding a firearm 
prohibition, as well as in Morrisey69 and Latimer70 (where the issue was not 
decided), regarding minimum terms of imprisonment. Where Parliament im-
poses a mandatory minimum sentence, it explicitly chooses to remove judicial 
discretion in favour of certainty and deterrence. In this context, the use of re-
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medial exemptions on a case-by-case basis directly frustrates Parliament’s 
intent, just as much as and arguably more so than would the use of “reading in” 
to exclude delineated categories. As Peter Sankoff writes: 
In Schachter, Lamer C.J. discussed the “reading in” remedy and stated that “the 
purpose of [the remedy] is to be as faithful as possible within the requirements of 
the Constitution to the scheme enacted by the Legislature.” In cases involving 
mandatory minimum sentences or other provisions deliberately omitting judicial 
discretion, it is arguable that an exemption will never be “as faithful as possible” to 
the scheme enacted. Obviously, one of the main purposes for enacting mandatory 
legislation was to establish certainty.71 
By removing both certainty and deterrence, remedial exemptions from man-
datory minimum sentences distort the legislative scheme and fail to satisfy the 
Schachter test for appropriate remedies. 
Where the impugned provision relates to the trial process, as in Seaboyer72 or 
Rose,73 the use of exemptions is equally difficult to justify. Here too, judicial 
deference does not support exemptions from mandatory rules of evidence or 
procedure. If “reading out” or “reading in” exempt categories is not appropriate 
because it would overly interfere with the legislative function, it is difficult to 
see how doing the same on a case-by-case basis is any more appropriate. The 
provision should be struck down. Alternatively, a court may exclude an element 
of evidence or even perhaps decide to simply stay the proceedings against the 
accused if the application of the rule compromises trial fairness.74 Parliament 
can then decide whether to amend the rules to introduce an element of 
flexibility or whether to keep it intact, even if that means losing some cases. In 
a successful Rowbotham75 application, failure by the government to provide 
funded counsel for the defence will not lead to the invalidation of the legal aid 
regime but, rather, to the staying of the proceedings.76  
Finally, where it is the offence itself that suffers from some constitutional 
infirmity, the use of remedial exemptions is even more problematic. Related to 
the idea of the “generic” and equally important to the rule of law is the concept 
that ours is not a system of “personalized law”. Unless they can be crafted by 
reference to an abstract class of persons (in which case we cease to be in the 
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realm of constitutional exemptions and move towards “reading in” or “reading 
down”) remedial exemptions are the judicial equivalent of private Acts.  
The difficult reconciliation of private Acts with the rule of law is nowhere 
more apparent than in the area of criminal law. The abhorrence of constitutional 
democracies to what has become known in the Anglo-Saxon world as “bills of 
attainder” requires little explanation.77 Bills of attainder, which were used in 
order to single out individuals for punishment, are offensive not merely because 
they usurp the judicial function,78 but because they reduce the rule of law to a 
purely formal process of individual designation and obviate what is ultimately 
the essence of law: the expression of rules governing generic categories of facts 
and conduct. But if remedial exemptions are little more than bills of attainder in 
reverse, it is unclear why exemptions should be looked at more favourably. 
One may argue that bills of attainder are fundamentally unprincipled and that 
they reflect mere political expediency, whereas exemptions result from the 
application of constitutional principles. The distinction, however, is not a nec-
essary one. Exemptions are  
distinguishable from “reverse bills of attainder” only to the extent that the 
accused’s conduct can be linked to a greater or more abstract category that is 
demonstrated by the court to be constitutionally significant. If such a demon-
stration is possible, however, constitutional exemptions arguably become un-
necessary. 
This is not to deny the practical convenience of remedial exemptions for the 
judge who is faced with a hard case and the challenges that the unavailability of 
remedial exemptions creates. But the experience to date demonstrates that our 
courts have been up to the task. Looking back at the first 20 years of the Char-
ter, it is hard to find a compelling argument to support the recognition of reme-
dial exemptions and the move towards an American approach of case-by-case 
application of the Charter. 
In searching for flexible remedies, a case that is worthy of some attention is 
the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Sharpe79 dealing, as previously indicated, 
with the Criminal Code offence of possessing child pornography. In crafting a 
Charter remedy, the majority indicated that a constitutional exemption was not 
appropriate and proceeded instead on the basis of what it described as “reading 
in” two exceptions that would operate as defences in addition to the defences 
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already provided in the Code. The interesting fact about the remedy, however, 
is that the “read in” exceptions were not couched in statutory form or “canoni-
cal” language. Indeed, the two exceptions are described on several occasions in 
the judgment (five, to be precise) using different language, sometimes (but not 
always) accompanied by significant qualifications.  
Relying on the language used in the majority’s conclusion, the second excep-
tion would cover “any visual recording, created by or depicting the accused, 
provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused 
exclusively for private use”.80 A literal application of this exception would 
suggest that an adult taking a pornographic picture of a five year old child 
would qualify for the exception since in this example there is no “unlawful 
sexual activity” taking place. Clearly, this was not the majority’s intent, as one 
would gather from reading paragraph 116:  
The second category would protect auto-depictions, such as photographs taken by a 
child or adolescent of him- or herself alone, kept in strict privacy and intended for 
personal use only. It would also extend to protect the recording of lawful sexual ac-
tivity, provided certain conditions were met. The person possessing the recording 
must have personally recorded or participated in the sexual activity in question. 
That activity must not be unlawful, thus ensuring the consent of all parties, and 
precluding the exploitation or abuse of children. All parties must also have con-
sented to the creation of the record. The recording must be kept in strict privacy by 
the person in possession, and intended exclusively for private use by the creator 
and the persons depicted therein. Thus, for example, a teenage couple would not 
fall within the law’s purview for creating and keeping sexually explicit pictures fea-
turing each other alone, or together engaged in lawful sexual activity, provided 
these pictures were created together and shared only with one another [emphasis 
added]. 
Material falling within the first exception (works of the imagination) could 
also raise difficult issues. For example, what about a situation where someone, 
using a computer, transforms an ordinary picture of a real child into a porno-
graphic image? Is such a work “created by the accused alone”? 
The possibility of such difficulties was readily acknowledged by McLachlin 
J. who, for the majority, wrote: 
I recognize that questions may arise in the application of the excepted categories. 
However, the same may be said for s. 163.1 as drafted. It will be for the courts to 
consider precise questions of interpretation if and when they arise, bearing in mind 
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Parliament’s fundamental object: to ban possession of child pornography which 
raises a reasoned apprehension of harm to children.81 
The interesting aspect of the remedy in Sharpe is that, in the absence of fixed 
language, the “read in” exceptions operate in a manner that is more analogous 
to a common law defence, the precise meaning of which is “discovered” and 
evolves over time through the course of adjudication. 
While allowing for flexibility, the remedy is one that provides substantial 
guidance (to courts, individuals and Parliament) by delineating, even if not with 
absolute precision, classes of persons who could benefit from the exceptions. In 
this way, the remedy is arguably consistent with the rule of law’s requirement 
of generality and clarity. Although Sharpe is an exceptional case and the rem-
edy not one that we would expect to see on a regular basis, it illustrates the 
capacity of courts to craft flexible remedies that avoid the grave problems 
associated with constitutional exemptions and their detrimental impact on the 
rule of law in Canada. 
2. The Rule of Law and the Dialogue Between the Courts and the 
Legislatures 
The ideal of a “government of laws and not of men” is as appealing as it is 
conceptually challenging. If there is no “god’s eye view” from which the mean-
ing of laws and constitutions can be objectively ascertained, how can we claim 
to live under the rule of law and not merely the rule of judges? Contemporary 
hermeneutics use the metaphor of a “dialogue” between the text and the reader 
to explain the interpretive process.82 This dialogical process is a never-ending 
one, where the meaning we give to texts is in a constant state of flux due to the 
ever-changing landscape that constitutes the interpretive horizon. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the idea of a “dialogue” has also gained popularity 
in recent years to describe the relationship between courts and legislatures. 
Under this model, the legal and constitutional landscape is progressively de-
fined as each institution responds in turn to the other’s view of what is permis-
sible under the Charter.83  
                                                                                                                                                              
81
  Id., at para. 123. 
82
  Largely under the influence of Gadamer’s foundational work, Truth and Method, original-
ly published in 1960. For an account of the influence of Gadamer’s dialogical model on contempo-
rary legal theory, see Campos, “That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous 
Text” (1992-93) 77 Minnesota Law Review 1065. 
83
  The scope of the “dialogue” can be conceived in narrow institutional terms, as a conversa-
tion between the legislative branch and the judiciary, or can be conceived of in a much richer way, 
where these institutions are themselves engaged in a dialogue with other segments of society such 
as the academia, unions, members of the media or the electorate in general. For the purposes of this 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Ifs and Buts in Charter Adjudication 397 
 
In the dialogue model, Parliament must turn its mind to the Constitution and 
provide its own interpretation of the limits imposed by the Charter. It must act 
in a principled way and be concerned not only with how a law may “in most 
cases” affect the rights of individuals, or with how the law will “usually” oper-
ate. It cannot rely on prosecutorial discretion and assume that people who 
should not be interfered with will simply be left alone.84 Parliament must strive 
to ensure that the legislation as drafted complies with the Charter, giving its 
own view of the Constitution’s requirements and taking into account what the 
courts have previously said. Like the courts, it must turn its mind to the law’s 
possible applications and ensure that it is appropriate in all reasonably foresee-
able cases. This requires vigilance. It is not an easy task and while it is a chal-
lenge well worth taking, courts will necessarily disagree in some cases with 
Parliament’s assessment. 
The courts’ interpretation of the Charter will, in turn, be influenced not only 
by previous cases but also by the legislation that is brought before them. Just as 
they look at the laws before them in light of the Charter, their view of the Char-
ter is informed by Parliament’s attempt to provide a legal framework for indi-
vidual behavior and social interactions in response to often difficult and 
complex problems. Where they find that acts of Parliament are not reconcilable 
with the Charter, their role is to intervene and, in so doing, attempt to provide 
guidance while at the same time remaining deferential to the legislative func-
tion. 
In almost every case there will be room for Parliament or the legislatures to 
respond. Parliament may follow the court’s suggestions or come up with alter-
native solutions. Ultimately, Parliament may decide to resort to the “notwith-
standing” clause found in section 33 of the Charter. 
The problem with remedial exemptions is that they thwart this constitutional 
dialogue at every stage. 
Remedial exemptions send the message to legislatures that they need not 
worry all that much, provided that the laws are “generally OK”. Unless a law is 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the Charter it should stand, leaving for an-
other day the task of resolving problems as they arise, on a case-by-case basis. 
Exemptions are, in practice, an invitation for sloppy legislation.  
                                                                                                                                                              
discussion, it is sufficient to focus on the institutional dialogue between the legislative branch and 
the judiciary, even though such a focus may not be entirely adequate to account for the behavior of 
both branches. The dialogue model seems to have emerged in both American and Canadian legal 
literature in the 1990’s. See, for example, Fitzgerald, supra, note 53, at 1-1 to 1-8.  
84
  This point is well established in Charter jurisprudence. As expressed by Cory J. (for the 
majority) in R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013, at 1063: “It has long been recognized that the holder 
of a constitutional right need not rely upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and restraint for 
the protection of the right.” Also see R. v. Smith, supra, note 20, at 1078. 
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Their acceptance as a Charter remedy to ill-crafted legislation leads or con-
tributes to what has been described elsewhere as a problem of “democratic 
debilitation”, which “occurs when the public and their democratically elected 
representatives cease to formulate and discuss constitutional norms, instead 
relying on the courts to address constitutional problems”.85 The occasional 
temptation to rely on courts to resolve controversial legal or social issues may 
perhaps be inevitable. However, recognizing remedial exemptions carries the 
risk of a much more profound change in the way legislators take into account 
Charter rights in developing legislation. Once this type of remedy becomes 
accepted, it is likely inevitable that courts will be more reluctant to strike down 
legislation based on hypothetical situations, as suggested by McLachlin C.J.’s 
comments in Sharpe. The legacy of early landmark cases such as Big M Drug 
Mart has been a significant disciplining effect on legislators who must provide 
rules that adequately take into consideration their effect on various segments of 
society and differently situated individuals. Perhaps this legacy is one that is 
more apparent to those who are involved in the inner workings of the legislative 
process, but it is one that the courts should be reluctant to jeopardize by open-
ing the door to remedial exemptions. 
In granting a remedial exemption but leaving the law intact, courts also send 
the troubling message that individuals may in certain circumstances have the 
right to disregard valid law and that civil disobedience may be perfectly justifi-
able, not just morally, but also legally under the Constitution. Remedial exemp-
tions relieve the courts of having to engage with the legislatures in defining 
appropriate lines of conduct. While they conveniently satisfy the claims of the 
litigant in a particular case, they provide little comfort for other individuals who 
may (or may not) be caught by the overbreadth of the legislation, thereby creat-
ing a chilling effect. In other words, exemptions are also an invitation for 
sloppy adjudication.  
More fundamentally, the use of remedial exemptions effectively interrupts 
the dialogue between the courts and legislatures. Of the four features identified 
by Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell in their oft-cited paper on the Charter dia-
logue, the first is the existence of the notwithstanding clause in section 33, 
which allows Parliament or the legislatures to override a court’s decision.86 
Leaving aside the issue of the legitimacy of resorting to section 33, the question 
raised by the use of remedial exemptions as an alternative to striking down is, 
what legislative form would a response based on section 33 take? In principle, 
                                                                                                                                                              
85
  Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty”, (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245, at 271. 
86
  Hogg & Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)”, (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, at 82. 
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the law could be simply re-enacted notwithstanding the Charter so as to ensure 
its universal application. In practice, however, this makes for an awkward 
response. The law, after all, is valid.  
In the vast majority of cases, however, Parliament or the legislatures will not 
want to use section 33 but rather fix the constitutional defect in the provision. 
But, by upholding the law and refusing to apply it to a particular litigant with-
out identifying a class of situations where the rule should not operate, legisla-
tors are given little guidance that could assist in recasting the provision in a 
way that better complies with the Charter, and even less incentive to do so.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
In the early years of the Charter’s application, judicial review in Canada has 
taken a path that is significantly different than in the United States. Permissive 
standing rules and broad interpretation of the Charter’s guarantees have al-
lowed for rigorous judicial review, disciplined the legislative function and 
helped provide everyone with clearer legal guidance. There should be no ambi-
guity about the message of this paper: constitutional exemptions are a signifi-
cant threat to this legacy and are, in many ways, detrimental to the rule of law. 
We have so far done without remedial exemptions and should continue to do 
so. 
Whether the Supreme Court will stay clear of remedial exemptions and only 
exceptionally grant ancillary exemptions is another question. Recent jurispru-
dence at least suggests that it is warming up to the idea of granting constitu-
tional exemptions. And, in fairness, the matter is hardly a simple one. On the 
one hand, even if we are to continue with generous rules of standing and the 
use of reasonable hypotheticals in Charter adjudication, how does a court deal 
with real fact situations that are marginal? If the law is held to be valid as it 
applies to reasonable hypothetical situations, should it be struck down in a 
subsequent “marginal” case?87 On the other hand, can the Charter require that 
legislation be crafted in a way that is perfectly tailored to each and every per-
son’s unique situation?88  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
87
  This issue is discussed in a forthcoming publication by Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemp-
tions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring A Swift Resolution”. 
88
 As Sopinka J. indicated in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 504-5, “[i]n determining 
whether less intrusive legislation may be imagined, this Court stressed in the Prostitution Refer-
ence, supra, that it is not necessary that the legislative scheme be the ‘perfect’ scheme […]”. 
Similarly, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, McLachlin 
J. (as she then was) wrote in discussing s. 1 (para. 160): 
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Remedies are not something that can be considered separately from the 
rights that they serve to uphold. In searching for a perfect response to individ-
ual claims, the danger to do more harm than good is a very real one. 
                                                                                                                                                              
As the second step in the proportionality analysis, the government must show that the 
measures at issue impair the right of free expression as little as reasonably possible in order to 
achieve the legislative objective. The impairment must be “minimal”, that is, the law must be 
carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary. The tailoring process 
seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If the 
law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely 
because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringe-
ment… . 
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